Author's profile

Giovanni Favara
International Monetary Fund

Background

Author articles

  • When a firm is in financial distress, its shareholders and debt holders may benefit from a debt renegotiation to avoid an inefficient bankruptcy or liquidation. The prospect of a debt reduction through a renegotiation may, however, induce shareholders to default even if the firm is solvent. The view that shareholders may default for strategic rather than for solvency reasons has proved useful in understanding, among other things, the theoretical determinants of corporate bond spreads, dividend policies, the optimal debt structure, and the valuation of debt and equity.

    This paper asks whether the option of shareholders to default strategically on the firm's debt explains differences in firms' equity risk across countries. It claims that the risk of equity should be lower for firms that operate in countries where the insolvency procedure favours debt renegotiations

    31/10/2012 | 6,413